Clickjacking protection

ABSTRACT

A clickjacking protector in an electronic system helps prevent unwanted clickjacking. The elements clicked on by the click position are evaluated to determine whether any of the elements clicked on by the click position is obscured (including being transparent or partially transparent). A protective action is generated in response to a determination that an element clicked on by the click position is obscured.

BACKGROUND

Network-enabled applications are applications that use communicationnetworks to share information between various devices, each of whichmight be operated by the same or different user. The network-enabledapplications include applications such as browser engines, messaginginterfaces, e-mail tools, remote desktops, and the like that allow usersto easily browse, select, and manipulate items being viewed using anetwork-enabled application. The network-enabled application receivesone or more communications (such as code for instantiating webpages)from a service provider that is often encoded in the form of a language(such as the hypertext markup language HTML), which describes thestructure and functionality of the content that is received by thecontent user.

The communication (such as a received webpage) often includesinformation that is rendered using a graphics engine and displayed inthe context of a graphics user interface (such as a windowed interface).Often, a cursor is used by the user to click on form submission boxesand hyperlinks of the displayed a graphics user interface. The cursor isnormally implemented using a graphics object (such as a sprite) that isdisplayed as a top level display object. Thus the cursor appears tofloat over lower portions (e.g., layers) of the graphics interface asthe cursor is moved across the display in response to user inputcommands (received from a mouse or trackball, for example).

However, malicious code that might be present in the network-enabledapplication (and/or computer upon which the network-enabled applicationis executing) can exploit the floating of the cursor over lower levelobjects by hiding a relatively small and/or transparent, yet clicked onelement. For example, the malicious code can detect the position of thecursor. The malicious code is capable of positioning the hidden clickedon element anywhere on page, including being hovered over a button suchas a play button.

When the user attempts to click a seemingly valid element (such as ahyperlink to a movie) by clicking on the seemingly valid element, forexample, the hidden clicked on element misdirects the selection (click)signal generated by the user and performs any action that is allowed inresponse to a user selection (including actions unintended by the user).This exploit of misdirecting a user selection signal is often referredto as “clickjacking,” a clickjacking attempt, user interface (UI)redress attack, or UI redressing. The malicious code can then exploitthe misdirected user selection signal by, for example, referring to alink that is included in the hidden clicked on element ostensibly forthe purpose of making (e.g., illegal or unfair) use of the exploitedinformation.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 is a network diagram illustrating a network that is suitable forpracticing aspects of clickjacking protection in accordance withexemplary embodiments of the disclosure;

FIG. 2 shows an illustrative computing device in accordance withexemplary embodiments of the disclosure;

FIG. 3 is a network diagram illustrating a network that includesclickjacking protection in accordance with exemplary embodiments of thedisclosure;

FIG. 4 is a logic diagram illustrating an clickjacking protector inaccordance with exemplary embodiments of the disclosure; and

FIG. 5 is a signaling diagram illustrating in conjunction with FIG. 4clickjacking protection in accordance with exemplary embodiments of thedisclosure.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

The following discussion is directed to various exemplary embodiments ofthe disclosure. Although one or more of these exemplary embodiments maybe preferred, the exemplary embodiments disclosed should not beinterpreted, or otherwise used, as limiting the scope of the disclosure,including the claims. In addition, one skilled in the art willunderstand that the following description has broad application, and thediscussion of any embodiment is meant only to be exemplary of thatembodiment, and not intended to intimate that the scope of thedisclosure, including the claims, is limited to that embodiment.

Certain terms are used throughout the following description—andclaims—to refer to particular system components. As one skilled in theart will appreciate, various names may be used to refer to a component.Accordingly, distinctions are not necessarily made herein betweencomponents that differ in name but not function. In the followingdiscussion and in the claims, the terms “including” and “comprising” areused in an open-ended fashion, and thus are to be interpreted to mean“including, but not limited to . . . .” Also, the terms “coupled to” or“couples with” (and the like) are intended to describe either anindirect or direct electrical, optical and/or wireless connection. Thus,if a first device couples to a second device, that connection can bemade through a direct connection, or through an indirect connection viaother devices and connections.

The term “domain” as used herein refers to either a domain or a portionof the domain (“subdomain”) if any. Thus, the term “subdomain” can beused to refer to a portion of the “domain.” A subdomain can be, forexample, a domain name server (DNS) record. For example, the name“www.example.com” can be used in a localized context to refer to adomain (notwithstanding the fact that “www.example.com” is itself asubdomain of “example.com”). While net-enabled applications such asbrowsers follow a “same origin” policy and tend to use the longerversion “www.example.com” as a domain name, the net-enabled applicationsalso use the shorter version “example.com” for certain purposes (such asfor cookies that are set with the domain switch). Thus all subdomains ofthe domain “a.com” include “no-subdomains” (such as “http://a.com/” and“http://whatever.a.com/”) and include the more-specific subdomains (suchas www.a.com).

FIG. 1 is a network diagram illustrating a network that is suitable forpracticing aspects of clickjacking protection in accordance withexemplary embodiments of the disclosure. Network system 100 includesconsumer 120, 130, and 140 (machines, for example), service provider150, third party resource provider 160, cellular communications provider170, and data storage provider 180. Consumers 120, 130, and 140 accessand communicate with network 110 using communication links 122, 132, and142 respectively. Each of the consumers 120, 130, and 140 can be (orinternally provide functions of) the (illustrative) computing device 200discussed below with reference to FIG. 2.

Network 110 typically includes a publically accessible network such asthe internet, but other networks (including private networks) can beused. Thus, network 110 is typically a collection of networks (andgateways) that typically use a TCP/IP suite of protocols forpacket-based communications. The internet typically employs high-speeddata communication lines between major nodes or host computers, but evenbandwidth between the major nodes is subject to degradation throughsatellite outages, hardware faults, denial of service attacks,oversubscription of services, and the like. The network connections areshown for the purpose of illustration, and other ways of establishing acommunications link between computers (such as using firewalls, asdiscussed below) can be used.

Consumers 120, 130, and 140 access the network 110 to access networkedservice providers of services such as service provider 150, third partyresource provider 160, cellular communications provider 170, and datastorage provider 180. Service provider 150 accesses network 110 viacommunication link 152, whereas third party resource provider 160accesses network 110 via communication link 162. Cellular communicationsprovider 170 accesses network 110 via communication link 172 andprovides, for example, further connectivity to cellular devices 176 viaa cellular network 174. Data storage provider 180 accesses network 110via communication link 182 to provide, for example, secure backupsystems for consumer 120 data. The actual data processing systems ofnetwork system 100 may include additional servers, clients, peers, andother devices not illustrated. Each of the service provider 150, thirdparty resource provider 160, cellular communications provider 170,cellular devices 176, and data storage provider 180 can be (orinternally provide functions of) the (illustrative) computing device 200discussed below with reference to FIG. 2.

FIG. 2 shows an illustrative computing device 200 in accordance withexemplary embodiments of the disclosure. For example, the computingdevice 200 includes a processing system 202 that is arranged to performspecific tasks in response to applications 238 and program data 240.Processing system 202 is often incorporated into a computing device suchas a mobile device, a personal digital assistant, a personal computer, adedicated web-enabled appliance, a kiosk terminal, automotiveelectronics, or any other type of networked electronic system orsubsystem.

The processing system 202 includes processors 210 and memory 220.Processors 210 may include one or more microprocessor (uP) cores 212 a,212 b, 212 c, and 212 d, each of which is optionally coupled to arespective, local cache 214 a, 214 b, 214 c, and 214 d. Memory 220includes a ROM (read-only memory) 222, RAM (random-access memory) 226,and storage 228 (such as a “hard” disk). ROM 222 optionally includesBIOS (basic input/output system) 224, which typically includes low-levelfirmware-based drivers for accessing, for example, low-level,hardware-based elements of computing device 200.

Memory 220 includes instructions and data for executing (software)applications 238 (for example), that when executed by processing system202, perform any suitable function associated with the computing device200. For example, the processing system 202 executes software (includingfirmware) and data components such as operating system 230, networkstack 232, browser 234, program modules 236, applications 238, programdata 240, and clickjacking protector 242.

Processing system 202 is accessible to users and non-local componentsusing interface 250. Interface 250 provides a user interface that istypically arranged to provide output to and receive input from the userduring the execution of the software applications 238. The output to theuser is provided by devices such as the display 254 (including indicatorlights and image projectors), a speaker 264, vibrations 262, and thelike. The input from the user is received using keyboard 256, mouse(and/or trackball) 258, touch/stylus screen 260, audio input 266 and/orvideo input 252. Other devices can be used such as keypads, switches,proximity detectors, and the like.

The interface 250 is also arranged to transmit communications to andfrom other computers across a network. Wireless link 268 permitscommunications using a modulated optical and/or electromagnetic carrier(such as cellular telephone communications). Cabled link 270 permitscommunications over a wired and/or optical link (such as opticalEthernet and/or Ethernet). The wireless link 268 and cabled link 270 areoptionally employed between other network-enabled devices to establishwide-area networks, local-area networks, private networks, and the like.Additionally, tangible media such as disk 272 or “flash” ROM 274 (andthe like) are used to store data and instructions and are read fromand/or written to by interface 250 in the course of execution of theclickjacking protector 242, for example.

FIG. 3 is a network diagram illustrating a network that includesclickjacking protection in accordance with exemplary embodiments of thedisclosure. Network system 300 includes service provider 150 and thirdparty resource provider 160, as discussed above. Service provider 150 isarranged to provide networked content (such as services, data and/orapplications, and the like) to consumer 120 via network 110. The contentand services are generally provided in the form of communications suchas webpages, where the webpages (and other communications) often containreferences (e.g., “links”) to “external” resources that are to beprovided by the third party resource provider 160 (which is also anetworked services provider).

Service provider 150 is a server (or a set of servers that are presentedas a single server or a “virtual” server for processing requests). Theconsumers 120, 130, and 140 are typically clients with respect to theserver (e.g., service provider 150). The consumers 120, 130, and 140are, for example, personal computers or networked computers.

The clickjacking protector 242 of consumer 120 is arranged to reduce orprevent, for example, clickjackings. Clickjackings that misdirect a userselection signal over an obscured element are used to initiateunintended (e.g., by the user of consumer 120) communications to a thirdparty resource provider 160. The clickjackings might possibly occur as aresult of accessing a hacked webpage that the user did not intend whenthe user initiated the user selection signal (click). The clickjackingprotector 242 is optionally arranged to initiate taking a protectiveaction such as sending a warning signal and/or blocking the selection ofan obscured malicious code element that is linked to a malicious codesite at the time the user initiates a click signal (by activating abutton on a pointing device such as a mouse, for example). The warningsignal can be a warning signal that is used for internal (triggering)purposes or for purposes of conveying a warning to a user or anadministrator of a third party resource provider 160 or other relatedwebsite that sent the webpage having the malicious code element.

FIG. 4 is a logic diagram illustrating a clickjacking protector inaccordance with exemplary embodiments of the disclosure. Network system400 includes, for example: consumer 120, service provider 150, and thirdparty resource providers 160 a and 160 b. Consumer 120 is arranged to(more securely) communicate with network 110 using communication links122, firewall 424, and communication link 422. Third party resourceproviders 160 a and 160 b are arranged to communicate with network 110using communication links 162 a and 162 b respectively.

Consumer 120 typically includes a network-enabled application 432 thatis arranged to conduct communications between service provider 150 andconsumer 120. For example, network-enabled application 432 includes astandards-compliant browser such as Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer,and the like. A user enters a URL (universal resource locator) or IP(internet protocol) address to select content 450 (or a portion thereof)hosted by service provider 150. The selection is relayed by the browservia the network 110 to the addressed service provider (e.g., serviceprovider 150) having the selected content.

Service provider 150 responds by sending a communication to the consumer120. The communication is received by the network interface 472 ofoperating system 470 and the communication is passed to thenetwork-enabled application 432 for decoding and, for example, renderingin the display 482.

The communication is often a webpage written in a markup language,although other formats can be used such as style sheets, JavaScriptreference, and the like. The webpage often contains references tocontent provided by the service provider 150 as well as content providedby one or more third party resource providers 160. The references in thereceived communication are, for example, instantiated by a DOM (documentobject model) 440 as the network-enabled application 432 parses thereceived communication in accordance with the format used to encode theinformation encoded in the received communication.

As the network-enabled application 432 parses the receivedcommunication, the network-enabled application 432 constructs a DOM 440(such as DOMs 440 a and 440 b) that delineates the structure and thefunction of the encoded information. The DOM 440 is arranged to loadrequested third party resources (such as third party resources 460 a or460 b), for example, to be used to manage a window 486 of a webpage(conveyed by the encoded information) for display in the display 482(typically via BIOS 471 of the operating system 470). The display 482 isused to provide visual indications to a user and to prompt the user forinput. The user input is captured using controls 484 (such as by akeyboard and/or a mouse) of the user interface 480.

Window 486 is a (e.g., computer program) application window that isarranged to display program output and to help capture user input.Window 486 is, for example, a window of a network-enabled application432 and includes a target element 488 that is arranged to be selected bya user using controls 484. The target element 488 is included in thereceived communication by the service provider 150 as a, for example,cross-domain element that is rendered by rendering engine 343 inaccordance with DOM 440 a, for example.

Cross-domain elements permit user selection signals (e.g., “clicks”) toreference domains that are outside of the parent domain in which thewindow 486 was originated. Examples of cross-domain elements includeadvertising banners, “like” buttons, “digg” buttons, and the like, eachof which initiates a cross-site reference that references the domainthat is outside of a parent domain of the webpage in which thecross-domain elements are “framed in.”

Many anti-CSRF (cross-site request forgery) protection mechanisms do notprovide adequate protection against clickjacking because valid users arepermitted to click on valid cross-domain websites (for example) usingcross-domain elements. A normal defense against clickjacking is to usean X-Frame-Options HTTP (hypertext transfer protocol) response header.For example, X-Frame-Options protects against clickjacking by breakingthe functionality of being included in a cross-domain request when thevalue for is set to “sameorigin.” However, the X-Frame-Options HTTPresponse header being set to “sameorigin” fails to allow otherwise validcross-domain requests (such as ad banners) to be honored when suchcross-domain requests are included in the same webpage response.

Window 486 is arranged to display various elements included in thereceived communication by the service provider 150 using layers in whichthe various elements are rendered by the rendering engine 343. Layermanager 474 is arranged to maintain a list of elements 476 a, 476 b, . .. and 476 z in accordance with information provided by a languagestandard used to render the received communications.

Layer manager 474 is also arranged to determine the order of the layersof the elements to determine, for example, the top layer (which isalways displayed), intermediate layers (e.g., which might be hiddenunder an element in a higher layer), and lower layers (e.g., which mightbe partially or completely obscured by elements in higher layers). Layermanager 474 also provides flags 478 that are used to provide status ofselected layers for determining, for example, what elements exist in thearea in a click occurs, and whether those elements are visible orotherwise obscured when rendered.

As an example, malicious code 462 can install a malicious code element492 (using DOM 440 b, for example) in a layer that is beneath the layerof the cursor 490. The malicious code 462 typically can make themalicious code element 492 invisible and/or strategically size themalicious code element 492. The malicious code 462 can track therepositioning of the cursor (with reference to track 494, for example)and maintain the position of the malicious code element 492 so that themalicious code element 492 remains hidden from the user during theentire traversal of the cursor 490 from position 495 along track 494 toposition 496.

When the user operating controls 484 moves the cursor 490 to position496 with the intent of clicking on target element 488 (which might be a“baited” link so as to induce clicking upon the target element), themalicious code element is likewise positioned under the cursor 490.Thus, when the user seemingly clicks the target element 488, the user iseffectively clicking upon the malicious code element 492 (which remainshidden from the user). The malicious code element 492 can also beobscured using techniques such as making the malicious code element 492invisible and/or by rendering the malicious code element 492 as apartially off-browser window. The malicious code element 492 is often across-domain element that is encoded as an iframe element so that theuser click of target element 488 is interpreted as a valid click ofmalicious code element 492 by the third party website.

To help prevent (and/or reduce) exploitation of by clickjacking bymalicious code 462, the clickjacking protector 430 (which is aclickjacking protector such as clickjacking protector 242) takes aprotective action such as preventing a transaction from being initiatedusing the malicious code element 492. The protective action can alsoinclude generating a warning signal that is used, for example, to reduceand/or prevent clickjacking by warning a user or the administrator ofthe third party website. The warning signal is generated by, forexample, the layer manager 474.

In an exemplary embodiment, the network-enabled application notifieslayer manager 474 (via signal bus 436) that a “click” command has beenreceived from a user (via controls 484). The layer manager 474determines a click position that is associated with the click commandand identifies all elements that have controls that overlap the clickposition.

The layer manager 474 evaluates the elements that overlap the clickposition to determine whether any overlapped element is substantiallyobscured by the cursor 490. (Whether an element is substantiallyobscured can be determined by evaluating the likelihood that a novicehuman observer would not visually notice the obscured element). Thelayer manager 474 can use the rendering engine 434 to determine a metricfor determining the degree to which a particular element is obscured.The layer manager can also use also use attributes of the obscuredelements such as degree of transparency, location in an off-browserwindow being partially off of a displayed web page, overlays, and thelike to determine whether the element is substantially obscured. Thedegree of transparency can range from an invisible value (where theelement is completely invisible) to an opaque value (where the elementblocks the view of any element directly below the element).

Upon a determination that the element is substantially obscured, thelayer manager 474 takes a protective action such as generating a warningsignal indicating that an obscured element has been clicked upon. Theclickjacking protector 430 uses the warning signal to, for example,notify the user and/or administrator that an obscured element has beenclicked upon. The clickjacking protector 430 can display a linkreferenced by the obscured element that was clicked on and query theuser for permission to proceed before proceeding with the transactionimplicated by the obscured element.

The clickjacking protector 430 can also use the warning signal to informa security service 466 (such as hosted by a third party resourceprovider 160) that an obscured element has been clicked upon. Thesecurity service 466 can reference attributes of the obscured element(including the referred-to link) against a malicious code list 468 ofknown dangerous sites before proceeding with the transaction implicatedby the obscured element. The security service 466 can probe the websitessurrounding the referred-to link to determine the safety of thesurrounding websites when the referred-to link does yet appear in themalicious code list 468.

The clickjacking protector 430 can also use the warning signal to blockproceeding with any transaction implicated by the obscured element.Automatically blocking the click signal from initiating any codeassociated with the obscured element provides a higher degree ofconfidence that an unwanted action would occur as a result of clickingon an obscured element.

A selection of querying the user, accessing a security service (whichcan also be located on the consumer 120—including portions thereof), andblocking the click transaction associated with the clicked on obscuredelement can be made using a degree of visibility of the obscuredelement, the degree in confidence in the identification of the obscuredelement by the security service, the degree in confidence of the user,user settings, HTML settings, and the like.

In another example, the determination of which elements are obscured canbe made as the webpage (for example) is initially rendered. When thecursor 490 is moved, the visibility of any changed element is evaluatedto determine whether any element beneath the cursor 490 is (or hasbecome) substantially obscured. When a click occurs that is focused upona click position that implicates an obscured element, a warning signalis generated and the click signal can be blocked as described above.

In yet another example, the clickjacking protector 430 can monitor thevisibility of any element that is a cross-site element (such as by usingflags 478 to denote the elements 476 that are cross-site elements). Ifany of the flagged elements are obscured in any way, a warning signal isgenerated and the click signal can be blocked as described above. Themonitoring of the visibility of any element can be controlled by, forexample, a “verb” added to the X-Frame-Options standard (and/or aseparate related standard) or by using a command programmed in HTML orJavaScript. The monitoring of the visibility of any element can be madein response to a timing event (such as a system timer or interruptsignal) or user-initiated actions (such as moving the cursor or clickinganywhere within a webpage).

Network-enabled applications (such as browser engines, messaginginterfaces, e-mail tools, remote desktops, and the like) can access theclickjacking protector 430 by adding to and/or replacing functionalityoften provided by the operating system 470. For example, an HTTP headerresponse in a received webpage can include a command that prohibits theresponse from being included by a cross-domain request when the receivedwebpage includes a command that prohibits a cross-domain request frombeing included by any cross-domain site unless the response includes acommand that indicates a (predetermined) cross-domain name is allowed tobe included in a cross-domain request. Thus, the HTTP header response(such as a modified X-Frame-Options header response) can prohibit anycross-domain site from being included in a cross-domain request unlessspecifically permitted (e.g., by domain name or IP address) beforehand.Thus, the HTTP header response command allows subdomain or domains to beinclusive of whatever the HTTP header response allows to be framed.

The applications can operate (at least to a degree) independently of theoperating system 470 (such as by monitoring the position of the cursor490 relative to the position of cross-site elements). Accordingly, abrowser application can operate in conjunction with (and/or incorporatefeatures of) the clickjacking protector 430. For example, theclickjacking protector 430 can generate the warning signal in the window486 itself, or as a URL (universal resource link) signal, a DNS (domainname server) signal, an HTTP (hypertext transfer protocol) header, orHTML (hypertext markup language) tag on the webpage itself.

Thus, the network-enabled application can use the warning signal to takean action (such as by blocking the transaction associated with theclicked on obscured element) without relying upon the operating system470 to specifically provide the functionality to specifically takingaction in response to the warning signal (such as by blocking thetransaction associated with the clicked on obscured element).

FIG. 5 is a signaling diagram illustrating in conjunction with FIG. 4clickjacking protection in accordance with exemplary embodiments of thedisclosure. Signaling diagram 500 illustrates communications transmittedand received between and amongst the user interface 480, for example,consumer 120, service provider 150, and third party resource provider160. A user at user interface 480 sends a command 510 to consumer 120for generating a request 511 for content (or other services) fromservice provider 150. In response, service provider 150 transmits acommunication 512 via an external network wherein the communication 512includes an element (such as target element 488) that is a cross-siteelement (which bypasses many conventional CSRF protections).

When the communication 512 is received and parsed (for example),consumer 120 constructs (for example) a DOM 440 that determines thestructure and function of window 486. The DOM 440 is rendered and theresults are sent via communication 513 to user interface 480 for displayin window 486. Window 486 includes a target element 488 that is arrangedto initiate a network transaction when the user clicks on the targetelement 488. However, malicious code 462 can hide an obscured element(such as malicious code element 492, which also can be a cross-sitereference) that is designed to be not noticed by the user and tomisdirect any click made by the user (for example, the malicious codeelement 492 can be arranged to follow the movement of the cursor 490 andthus make it much more likely that the malicious code element 492 willbe clicked).

The user at user interface 480 (who might not be able to notice theobscured malicious code element 492) positions, for example, the cursor490 over the target element 488 via cursor positioning command 514. Atthat time, a user at user interface 480 clicks on the target element 488by generating a click command 516, ostensibly for the purpose ofnavigating to the webpage implicated by target element 488. However, themalicious code element 492 is able to misdirect the click command 516because the malicious code element 492 is interposed in a layer that isbetween the cursor 490 and the target element 488. In response to theclick command 516 being generated, the clickjacking protector 430 isnotified of the click command in operation 518.

In response to the clickjacking protector 430 being notified of theclick command in operation 518, the clickjacking protector 430 notifies(in operation 520) the layer manager 474 of the click command and thecoordinates of the click position. The clickjacking protector can notifyalso notify the network-enable interface not to permit any cross-sitetransactions, for example, until receiving permission from theclickjacking protector 430. (Typically, the permission—if any—is grantedafter the click has been evaluated by the layer manager 474.)

Layer manager 474 determines the order of the layers of the elements todetermine, what elements exist in the area in a click occurs, andwhether those elements are visible or otherwise obscured when rendered.In operation 522, the layer manager 474 notifies the clickjackingprotector 430 that the click position is associated with an obscuredelement (which is thus potentially a malicious code element 492).

In operation 524, the network-enabled application 432 is notified thatthe click position is associated with an obscured element, whereupon thenetwork-enabled application takes protective action(s) such asselectively querying the user (as in communication 525), accessing asecurity service (such as security service 466), and/or blocking theclick transaction as described above. Accordingly, when malicious codeelement 492 (installed by malicious code 462, for example) on consumer120 tries to signal the network-enabled application 432 in operation 526of the user-generated click on the malicious code element 492, thenetwork-enabled application 432 (being signaled that the an obscuredelement has been clicked upon) selectively blocks the attemptedoperation 528 of contacting the third party resource provider 160. Thus,the malicious code 462 is unable to initiate a communication 528directed to the third party resource provider 160 b or other points thatare unknown and/or distrusted.

The various exemplary embodiments described above are provided by way ofillustration only and should not be construed to limit the claimsattached hereto. Those skilled in the art will readily recognize variousmodifications and changes that could be made without following theexample exemplary embodiments and applications illustrated and describedherein, and without departing from the true spirit and scope of thefollowing claims.

1. A method of protecting against clickjacking in an electronic system,comprising: receiving from a consumer machine a request for networkedcontent; transmitting in response to the received request a networkedcommunication that includes a command that enables clickjack protectionthat allows cross-domain accesses when a click position clicks on anobscured element rendered from the transmitted networked communicationwhen the clickjack protection is enabled.
 2. The method of claim 1,wherein the command is arranged to selectively block clicks tocross-domain sites that are linked-to by the clicked on obscuredelement.
 3. The method of claim 1, wherein the transmitted response istransmitted to the consumer machine.
 4. The method of claim 3, whereinthe transmitted response includes a webpage that is associated with adomain.
 5. The method of claim 3, wherein the webpage includes across-site reference that references the domain that is outside of aparent domain of the webpage in which the cross-domain elements areframed.
 6. The method of claim 5, wherein the obscured element clickedon by the click position includes a cross-site element.
 7. The method ofclaim 6, wherein the obscured element clicked on by the click positionis obscured by the cursor image.
 8. The method of claim 6, whereindetermining whether a click position clicks on an obscured element ismade by determining whether the transparency of the obscured elementclicked on by the click position ranges from an invisible value to anopaque value.
 9. The method of claim 8, wherein the any obscured elementclicked on by the click position includes malicious code.
 10. The methodof claim 9, comprising comparing a link associated with an obscuredelement clicked on by the click position with a list of sites known tocontain malicious code.
 11. The method of claim 3, comprising receivinga document for display by a network-enabled application of theelectronic system that includes a command that the received document isto be monitored for clickjacking attempts.
 12. The method of claim 11,wherein the list of sites known to contain malicious code is provided bya security service that is networked to the electronic system.
 13. Themethod of claim 12, wherein the transmitted response includes an HTTP(hypertext transfer protocol) header response.
 14. The method of claim13, wherein the HTTP header response is arranged to prohibit across-domain site from being included in a cross-domain request unlessotherwise permitted.
 15. A non-transitory tangible medium includinginstructions that, when executed on a processor of an electronic system,protect against clickjacking in an electronic system, comprising:receiving from a consumer machine a request for networked content;transmitting in response to the received request a networkedcommunication that includes a command that enables clickjack protectionthat allows cross-domain accesses when a click position clicks on anobscured element rendered from the transmitted networked communicationwhen the clickjack protection is enabled.
 16. The medium of claim 15,comprising selectively blocking clicks to cross-domain sites that arelinked-to by any obscured element clicked on by the click position. 17.The medium of claim 16, wherein the transmitted response is transmittedto the consumer machine.
 18. The medium of claim 15, wherein thetransmitted response includes a webpage that includes a cross-sitereference that references the domain that is outside of a parent domainof the webpage in which the cross-domain elements are framed.
 19. Themedium of claim 15, comprising transmitting a document for display by anetwork-enabled application that includes a command that prohibits across-domain request from being included by any cross-domain site unlessa cross-domain response includes a command that indicates a cross-domainname is allowed to be included in a cross-domain request, wherein thecross-domain name is the name of the domain or subdomain from which thecross-domain request originates.
 20. The medium of claim 15, comprisingtransmitting a document for display by a network-enabled applicationthat includes a command that the received document is to be monitoredfor clickjacking attempts.
 21. A web browsing system, comprising: anetwork-enabled interface of a service provider that is arranged toreceive from a consumer machine a request for networked content and totransmit to the consumer machine a networked communication that includesrequested network content and includes a command that enables clickjackprotection that allows cross-domain accesses when a click positionclicks on an obscured element rendered from the transmitted networkedcommunication when the clickjack protection is enabled, wherein thenetworked communication describes the structure and functionality ofcontent of the networked communication.
 22. The system of claim 21,wherein the transmitted network communication includes an HTTP(hypertext transfer protocol) header response.
 23. The system of claim21, wherein the HTTP header response is arranged to prohibit across-domain site from being included in a cross-domain request unlessotherwise permitted.
 24. The system of claim 21, wherein the commandthat enables clickjack protection is arranged to selectively blockclicks that attempt to access cross-domain sites that are linked-to byany obscured element clicked on by the click position.
 25. The system ofclaim 24, wherein the transmitted networked communication is transmittedto the consumer machine.
 26. The system of claim 25, wherein thetransmitted networked communication includes a webpage that isassociated with a domain.
 27. The system of claim 25, wherein thewebpage includes a cross-site reference that references the domain thatis outside of a parent domain of the webpage in which the cross-domainelements are framed.
 28. The system of claim 21, wherein the transmittednetworked communication includes a command that the transmittednetworked communication is to be monitored for clickjacking attempts.29. The system of claim 21, wherein the obscured element is associatedwith malicious code by a clickable click position associated with anelement of the transmitted networked communication.
 30. The system ofclaim 21, wherein the transmitted networked communication includes acommand that prohibits being included by a cross-domain request whereinthe received communication includes a command that prohibits across-domain request from being included by any cross-domain site unlessa cross-domain response includes a command that indicates a cross-domainname is allowed to be included in a cross-domain request, wherein thecross-domain name is the name of the domain or subdomain from which thecross-domain request originates.